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Contribution prepared for the Annual Meeting of the Verein für Socialpolitik 
D-Bonn, 28-30 September 2005 
The Purpose and Limits of Social Health Insurance 
 
by Peter Zweifel (University of Zurich)* 
pzweifel@soi.unizh.ch  
 
 
1. Introduction and motivation 
This contribution seeks to answer two related questions. First, what is the purpose of 
social health insurance? Or put in slightly different terms, what are the reasons for 
social (or public) health insurance to exist, even to dominate private health insurance in 
most developed countries? And second, what are the limits of social health insurance? 
Can one say that there is “too much” social health insurance in the following two 
senses: Should the balance be shifted towards the private alternative? And is the degree 
of coverage excessive? 
 
Accordingly, the plan of this paper is as follows. Section 2 is devoted to the efficiency, 
public choice, and equity reasons that may explain the existence (but not necessarily the 
prominence) of social health insurance. After having examined the demand for social 
insurance, its supply is analyzed in section 3. A simple model expounding the trade-off 
between innovation and risk selection effort of a private and a social health insurer will 
be developed. The innovation dimension importantly comprises efforts at containing 
                                                 
* In sections 3 and 6, this paper draws heavily on Zweifel, P. and Breyer, F. (2005), The Economics of 
Social Health Insurance, in: A. Jones (ed.) Palgram Companion of Health Economics, forthcoming. 
The author would like to thank M. Breuer and P. Eugster (University of Zurich) for helpful criticisms and 
suggestions. 
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moral hazard; therefore, the model may provide a preliminary answer also to the issues 
of ’excessive coverage provided by social health insurance’. This is followed by the 
economic theory of the optimal health insurance contract in section 4, which provides 
the benchmark for a discussion of actual outcomes of both a private and a regulated 
social health insurance market (section 5). It would be preferable to be able to describe 
and evaluate ‘equilibria’; however, there is not only a price and a single quality 
dimension to be determined and evaluated. Therefore, the discussion will be somewhat 
descriptive at this points. Section 6 provides a survey of the future challenges 
confronting health insurance and an assessment of social and private insurance to cope 
with them. The final section offers a few conclusions and suggestions for future 
research. 
 
2. Why social health insurance? 
Most developed countries have some kind of collective financing for health services, 
either through tax (e.g. the National Health Service on the United Kingdom) or through 
their contributions to social health insurance (henceforth: SHI). This type of insurance is 
usually characterized by mandatory membership, at least for the vast majority of the 
population, open enrolment, and community rating, i.e. a prohibition to charge 
premiums related to individual risk. From a normative point of view, the institution of 
SHI can be defended on both efficiency and equity grounds, whereas positive 
economics can explain its existence in democracies on the basis of public choice 
models. 
 
2.1 Efficiency reasons: characteristics of private health insurance markets 
SHI may be efficiency-enhancing if it mitigates or even eliminates possible market 
failures.  
(a) Asymmetric information. Ever since the seminal contribution by Rothschild 
and Stiglitz (1976), private competitive insurance markets are suspected to exhibit 
adverse selection due to asymmetric information. If the insured have more precise 
information on their individual risk distribution than does the insurer, the only 
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sustainable Rothschild-Stiglitz equilibrium is a separating one in which only the highest 
risk types are offered complete coverage at actuarially fair premiums. Lower risks 
obtain more favorable terms but are rationed in terms of coverage. They would prefer to 
have more coverage, but this would make their contract attractive to unfavorable risks. 
Compared to such a separating equilibrium, SHI which forces all individuals into a 
pooling contract with partial coverage can achieve a Pareto improvement. High risks are 
made better off because they pay lower premiums for the mandated part of their 
coverage, whereas low risks benefit from improved total (social plus private) coverage 
(Newhouse 1996). However, it is unclear to what extent asymmetric information on 
health risks is really a problem since medical exams are used to determine the risk of an 
insured. 
 
(b) Altruism and free riding. Altruistic rich members of society may be willing 
to subsidize the provision of health care to the poor if they are more interested in the 
health than in the subjective well-being of the poor (Pauly 1970). Private charity is not 
suitable to reach an efficient allocation since donations to the poor, whether in cash or in 
kind, have a public-good characteristic, increasing the utility not only of the donor but 
also of other altruistic members of society. Either a tax-financed National Health 
Service or SHI with compulsory membership and contributions according to ability to 
pay solve this free-rider problem of potential donors. Note that this argument implies 
that social health insurance is an institution serving the interests of the rich rather than 
the poor, as argued by Feldstein (2005). 
 
(c) Optimal taxation when health and income are correlated. A related 
justification of SHI is derived from the theory of optimal taxation (Cremer and Pestieau, 
1996). If abilities cannot be observed by tax authorities, the extent to which income 
taxation can be used for redistribution from the high-skilled to the low-skilled is limited 
because the high-skilled can always “pretend” to be low-skilled by reducing their labor 
supply. However, if there is a negative correlation between ability and the risk of 
illness, a mandatory SHI with community rating implicitly redistributes between the 
ability groups in the desired fashion and thus improves social welfare. It must be 
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emphasized, however, that this justification departs from Paretian welfare economics by 
postulating a specific redistributive goal.  
 
2.2 Equity reasons  
A further justification, also known as the ‘principle of solidarity’, relates to the 
achievement of equality of opportunity. People differ in their health risk already at birth, 
and some indicators of risk are readily observable. Moreover, with the rapid progress of 
genetic diagnostics and the spread of tests during pregnancy, the ability to measure 
individual health risks of newborns will become more and more pronounced. In private 
health insurance (PHI), these differences in risk immediately translate into differences 
in premiums. This causes persons who are endowed by nature with a lower stock of 
‘health capital’ and are thus already disadvantaged to have to pay a higher price for the 
same coverage on top of their handicap. Behind the veil of ignorance, risk-averse 
individuals would prefer to see at least the financial cost of illness spread equally 
between member of society. 
Table 1: Alternatives for achieving solidarity 
Alternatives Advantages Disadvantages References 
Current 
transfer 
Means testing; definition 
of benchmark contract 
Premium 
subsidy 
Lump sum 
transfer for 
lifetime 
Permits full 
competition in PHI (or 
SHI) both in 
premiums and 
products and full 
information on risk 
Means testing; longevity 
risk shifted to 
beneficiaries 
 
Pauly et al. 
1992 
Knappe 
2005 
Regulation: Community 
rating 
Relieves public budget Induces cream 
skimming and 
necessitates a RAS as 
secondary regulation 
Van de Ven 
et al. 2000 
Note: RAS = risk adjustment scheme 
 
There are in principle two main ways to achieve solidarity in health insurance (see 
Table 1). First, PHI premiums can be subsidized for those who would have to pay 
excessive contributions in two variants. The transfer could be on a current basis. Or it 
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could be a lump sum, equal to the estimated present value of future excess premiums 
over the whole expected life span of beneficiaries. Both have the important advantage of 
permitting full competition in PHI (or SHI), including insurers acquiring information 
about true risk. Besides means testing and the need to define a benchmark contract to 
determine the amount of the subsidy, the second variant has the disadvantage of shifting 
the risk of longevity to beneficiaries. The second main alternative is a monopolistic SHI 
scheme with open enrolment and community rating that prevents differences in health 
risk from being translated into differences in contributions but induces cream skimming 
and risk adjustment schemes (RAS, see below) as a secondary neutralizing regulation.  
 
2.3 Public choice reasons  
In PHI, redistribution occurs purely by chance, from consumers who do not suffer a loss 
during the life of the contract to those who do. By way of contrast, social insurance 
mixes in elements of systematic redistribution. The fact that contributions are not (or 
not fully) graded according to risk (OECD 2004) alone serves to systematically 
redistribute wealth from high risks to low risks. In SHI, this redistribution not only 
affects wealth through its financing side but the benefit side as well, viz. medical 
services and health. This makes social health insurance an ideal means for a politician 
who seeks office (or re-election) by catering to the interests of groups who are 
sufficiently organized to have an effect on the outcome of an election (Gouveia 1997; 
Hindriks and De Donder 2003; Tullock 2003). The redistributive effects of SHI can be 
described as follows. 
 
(a) Redistribution of wealth. Using SHI as a vehicle for systematic redistribution 
has the important advantage that net payers have considerable difficulty determining the 
systematic component of redistribution. For example, when the contribution to SHI 
amounts to a payroll tax (as e.g. in Germany), high wage earners pay more for their 
health insurance. However, they are uncertain about the systematic redistribution 
component of their contribution because the expected value of their benefits may also 
be higher than average (Henke, 2005). This may have two reasons: Preventive effort 
may be affected negatively by a higher wage, resulting in higher health costs, and 
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demand for medical services may increase because short-term disability benefits usually 
increase with wages, creating a spill-over moral hazard effect (Zweifel and Manning 
2000). Therefore, their higher contribution appears “justified”, masking a tax 
component which if collected as a tax would likely be opposed. However, as shown by 
Feldstein (2005) for Medicare in the United States, SHI in fact benefits the middle and 
upper classes, who live long enough to use the health care services covered by 
medicare. 
 
(b) Redistribution of medical care.  There are two effects here. First, there is an 
income effect because some individuals who would have demanded less or no medical 
care without insurance coverage now demand a positive amount of it (Nyman 2003). 
Indeed there is (macro) evidence suggesting that medical care is a normal good 
(Gerdtham et al. 1992; Miller and Frech 2004; Zweifel et al. 2005). Insurance coverage 
then amounts to an in-kind redistribution from the rich to the poor if the supply of 
medical services is not infinitely elastic and if the price elasticity of demand for medical 
care is not lower for the rich than the poor (which is doubtful, see Newhouse et al. 1993, 
ch. 11) . However, there is also a price effect because health insurance boosts the ‘true’ 
(out-of-pocket) willingness-to-pay (WTP) for medical care depending on the rate of 
coinsurance (Zweifel and Breyer 1997, ch. 10). For example, if ‘true’ WTP is 100 and 
the rate of coinsurance is 25 percent, observed WTP is 400. 
   
(c) Redistribution of health. Altruism with regard to health is probably more 
marked than with regard to income, although comparative evidence seems to be lacking 
(the methodology for measuring distributive preferences for health is still in its infancy, 
see Olsen 2000). Therefore, politicians can claim to have a mission when seeking to 
guarantee “health for all” (the famous slogan of the World Health Organization). Equal 
access to health insurance then may be seen as an important factor for securing equal 
access to medical care, and to the extent that medical care is effective at the margin [for 
which there is some evidence, see e.g. again Miller and Frech (2004) and Lichtenberg 
(2004) for securing equal health status Culyer and Wagstaff (1993)].  
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If SHI indeed contributes to winning votes and to increasing the chance of  
(re-)election of a democratic government, one would expect public expenditure for it to 
increase around election time. One piece of available evidence relates to two types of 
public expenditure by the Dutch government, expressed as shares in GDP, between ca. 
1956 and 1993, viz. health (such as subsidies to hospitals) and tax contributions to 
social insurance in general. Van Dalen and Swank (1996), cited in Zweifel (2000a), find 
that while public expenditure on health does not vary around election time, transfers in 
favor of social insurance are systematically higher during the years prior, concurrent 
with, and after an election. The estimated effect is 13 percent, e.g. an increase from 15 
to 17 percent of GDP. In addition, the share of the pensioners in the population is 
significantly related to both types of public expenditure.  Nowadays pensioners are not 
poor, but they do go to the polls. The evidence thus is compatible with governments 
proposing social health insurance schemes to benefit pivotal voter groups. 
 
Conclusion 1: While the efficiency reasons for social (health) insurance have received 
much attention in the literature, they are found not fully convincing. As 
to the equity reasons, targeted premium subsidies emerge as an 
alternative to community rating. On the whole, the available empirical 
evidence suggests that public choice reasons (i.e. winning votes) may 
well be the crucial reason for the existence and even more for the growth 
of social (health) insurance.  
 
3. The supply of social health insurance 
According to the argument advanced toward the end of the previous paragraph, 
governments (and public administration) could be seen as the suppliers of social health 
insurance. This is true in systems of the National Health Service type, where in fact the 
government itself provides the insurance function while also acting as the organizer of 
medical care. This type will be called „public health insurer“in the following. However, 
in a majority of industrialized countries, health insurers are not incorporated in the 
government’s budget; they will be called „(competitive) social health insurers”.  
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3.1 Supply by a competitive social health insurer 
Supply of health insurance can be characterized by several dimensions (Zweifel, 2005), 
such as comprehensiveness of the benefit package, the amount of loading included in 
the premium, the degree of vertical integration of healthcare providers, the amount of 
effort devoted to risk selection, and the degree of seller concentration. For simplicity, 
only two decision variables will be analyzed below which however are of particular 
interest for policy. On the one hand, the insurer can devote effort to innovation (i), 
resulting in new benefits covered but also – and even more importantly – in a better 
control of ex-post moral hazard (i.e. moral hazard given that illness has occurred). 
Developing managed care alternatives or contracts with bonus options for no claims are 
examples of such costly efforts.  
 
On the other hand, the insurer can invest in risk selection effort (s), trying to ‘skim the 
cream’, an activity that has no social value (assuming that the threat of being found to 
be a high risk does not induce preventive effort on the part of consumers). Let µ(i,s) 
denote the share of high risks in the insurer’s population at risk; this share not only 
depends on s but also on i because innovation typically appeals to younger consumers 
(which are lower risks at least on average). The premium (and hence the present value 
of their flow P) is regulated to be uniform and constant for simplicity. However, high 
and low risks differ in their probability (πh, πl) of claiming benefits during the planning 
period of the insurer. As noted above, innovation effort also has the effect of lowering 
the present value of losses L, which are assumed not to depend on the type of insured, 
again for simplicity. Finally, both innovation and selection effort have a price of one.  
 
Although social health insurers may not per se pursue the maximization of expected 
discounted profit  EΠ, they still want to ensure their economic survival in the face of 
competition. To this end, accumulating reserves is of some importance. However, this 
ultimately implies behavior no different from maximizing expected discounted profit 
(of course under regulatory constraint, which also may result in a planning horizon that 
differs from a for-profit insurer). Therefore, the objective function of such a social 
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health insurer may written as (see Zweifel and Eisen, 2002, ch. 5.5.2 for a similar 
model), 
(1) ( ) ( ) ( )
,
max ( ) 1 ( , ) ( )( , ) ,h l
i s
P L i i s P L iE i s i sπ µ πµ − − −Π = + − −   
 with      0,       0,       0.L
i s i
µ µ∂ ∂ ∂< < <∂ ∂ ∂  
Neglecting boundary solutions, the first-order conditions for an optimum are given by 
 (2) ( ) ( ) ( )1 1 0h h l lE LP L P Li i i i iµ µπ µ π π µ π∂ Π ∂ ∂ ∂ ∂   = − + − − − + − − −  ∂ ∂ ∂ ∂ ∂   L =  
 (3)    ( ) ( ) 1 0h lE P L P Ls s s .µ µπ π∂ ∂= − − − − =∂ ∂ ∂∂ Π  
Focusing on equation (2) first, and multiplying it by (i / µ), one obtains 
 (4) ( ) ( ){ } ** * * *( ) ( )
( )( ) ( )
1 /h l h li L iP L P L L L
i i L
µ π π µ π µ π µ iµ µ− +−− +
  ∂ ∂   − − − − + − =   ∂ ∂    
 
The first term on the left-hand side (LHS) is an elasticity [e(µ,i)] indicating how much a 
one percent increase in innovative effort serves to decrease (in percent) the share of high 
risks in the insurer’s population. It is treated as a constant in the following, although its 
value in general will depend on the levels of both i and s. The term in brackets is also 
negative. With a common present value of premiums P, the high risks cause a negative 
contribution to expected profit and the low risks a positive one. Together, these two 
terms define a first component of the marginal benefits of innovative effort.  
 
The second component again contains an elasticity [e(L,i)], which indicates the 
effectiveness of innovation in terms of lowering the amount of future losses L. The term 
in brackets multiplied by L is nothing but the overall expected value of discounted 
future losses. This makes sense: Efforts at controlling ex-post moral hazard have a 
particularly high marginal benefit if the initial amount of expected losses is high; 
accordingly, the optimal value of innovation s* is higher ceteris paribus (see the right-
hand side (RHS) of equation (4)). However, the last factor (1/µ) shows that this benefit 
is dissipated across the high risks. The higher their share, the smaller this second 
component of benefits of innovation. Finally, the RHS of equation (4) is nothing but the 
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marginal (= average) cost of innovation, which amounts to the total cost distributed 
across the high risks.  
 
Turning to equation (3) now and multiplying it through by (s / µ), one obtains 
(5) ( ) ( ){ } **( )
( ) ( )
h ls sP L P L
s
µ π πµ µ−
− +
 ∂  − − − = ∂  
 
The first term on the LHS is again an elasticity [e(µ,s) < 0], indicating the effectiveness 
of selection effort. Not surprisingly, the term in brackets shows the negative overall 
contribution to expected discounted profits. Therefore, the greater the difference 
between the two types of risk in the face of the uniform premium, the higher the optimal 
amount of selection effort s*, ceteris paribus [see the RHS of eq. (5)]. However, its 
marginal cost can again be distributed over the number of high-risk insured µ. 
 
Of course, a thorough discussion of the interplay of the two decision variables and their 
responses to exogenous changes would necessitate a full-blown comparative static 
analysis. This is relegated to the Appendix.  The result with regard to risk adjustment 
can be stated as follows. Risk adjustment is designed to neutralize a competitive 
insurer’s incentive to ‘skim the cream’ by making an insurer who has an above-average 
share of favorable risks pay a contribution into the risk adjustment scheme (RAS) which 
can be used to ‘subsidize’ a competitor who has an above-average share (for an 
extended discussion, see Van de Ven and Ellis, 2000). In the present context, the net 
discounted premium P would be raised by the contribution to be paid to the RAS for a 
high risk, ideally causing the difference P – πh L in equation (5) to go to zero, while the 
RAS payment received would increase P to make P – πl L zero as well. In this case, 
equation (5) implies s* = 0 as an optimum: the incentive for risk selection is neutralized.  
 
However, the RAS has a side effect on innovative effort. For indeed, the first term on 
the LHS of equation (4) goes to zero as well. After all, one component of the marginal 
benefit of innovation was to attract the mobile, younger, usually favorable risks. With 
this term equal to zero, i* has a lower value, ceteris paribus. Now the ceteris paribus 
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clause does not really hold because selection effort also is lowered. The second benefit 
component on the LHS is strongly lowered (its derivative w.r.t. µ being – πl L/µ2), 
which is true of the RHS as well, its derivative being – i*/µ2). On balance, it appears 
that this indirect effect of the RAS on innovative effort is unlikely to dominate the first-
order effect, which points toward a decrease of i*. Indeed, the experience of those 
countries that have introduced competition between social health insurers combined 
with a RAS (such as Germany, the Netherlands, and Switzerland) has been somewhat 
disappointing. Health insurers have been rather slow launching new products; of course, 
they may have been hampered by regulation in addition to the RAS (Beck et al., 2003). 
 
3.2 Supply by a public health insurer 
Since the manager of a public insurance scheme is a public official, the full set of  
interactions between a politician, a bureaucrat, and a voter should be specified in 
principle [as e.g. in Alesina and Tabellini (2002); see also Boldrin and Rustichini (2000) 
and Hammond and Knott (1996); for a comparative description of regulation of social 
health insurers, see Maarse et al. (2004)]. Here, a much simpler alternative will be 
presented that has the advantage of facilitating comparisons with section 2.1 above. 
 
From the outset, there are at least two institutional differences that need to be noted. 
First, a public insurance scheme typically is not allowed to build major reserves. 
Reserves are also unnecessary because economic survival of the scheme is assured by 
the government. This means that a public official pursuing his or her mission prefers to 
have a balanced budget. However, if there is a deviation D from a balanced budget, the 
likelihood ρ(D) that the envisaged utility level can be in fact attained decreases. The 
public official faces a certain probability of losing his or her position (the utility 
associated with the possible alternative employment is normalized to zero for 
simplicity). The official’s objective function can then be written 
(6) ( ) ),(* DUDEU ρ=   with   0.U D
D
∂ <∂   
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If there is a deficit (D < 0), then the official has an increase in utility if  D increases 
towards zero ( 0>∂
∂
D
U ); if the scheme has a surplus (D > 0) however, a further increase 
in D causes a decrease in utility [for a similar formulation in the case of a public 
hospital, see Zweifel and Breyer (1997), ch. 9.3.2]. The respective marginal utilities are 
normalized to  1±=∂
∂
D
U  below. 
The second difference concerns the decision variables. The public scheme being a 
monopoly enrolling the entire population, it has no reason to exert any risk selection 
effort; moreover, the share of high risks µ, being exogenous, does not respond to 
innovative effort i. The only decision variable remaining therefore is i, innovative effort. 
 
In view of these considerations, and focusing on the case of a deficit (D < 0, 1=∂
∂
D
U ), 
one can write the public health insurer’s objective function as 
 
(7) ( ) ( )( ){ }max max ( ) ( ) ( ) 1 ( )h l
i
EU D D D P L i P L i iρ ρ µ π µ π= = − + − − − , with 
( )( ) ( ) ( )( ): 1h lD P L i P L iµ π µ π= − + − − − .i  
 
            Noting that D depends on L(i), the first-order condition for an interior solution reads 
 
(8) 0)( =⋅∂
∂+⋅∂
∂⋅∂
∂ ρρ
i
DD
i
D
D
D . 
  
This can be divided by ρ to become,  
(9) 01
)(
)( =+


 ⋅∂
∂
D
D
D
D
ρ
ρ
 
 1),()(
)( −==


 ⋅∂
∂ De
D
D
D
D ρρ
ρ
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The elasticity  e(ρ,D) must be exactly –1 in the optimum. Since it is assumed tro be a 
constant, this equality is satisfied for an value of innovative effort . Among these 
values, I**=0 has the advantage of not charging the insurer’s budget. Therefore, the 
prediction is that the public monopoly insurer has no incentive to innovate.  
**i
 
Conclusion 2: A simple model of behavior of a competitive health insurer subject to 
premium regulation predicts a weakening of interest in product 
innovation when regulation is complemented by risk adjustment. A  
monopolistic public health insurer has a still weaker incentive to 
innovate. 
4. The design of an optimal health insurance contract 
The efficiency reasons given above for the existence of SHI with compulsory 
membership are convincing only if the design of the SHI contract is in some sense 
‘optimal’ from the point of view of the representative consumer (see e.g. Zweifel and 
Breyer 1997, ch. 6). In view of the tendency towards full coverage of most SHI 
schemes, an issue of particular importance are the circumstances justifying copayments, 
.i.e. deviations from full coverage of health care expenditures.  
(a) Administrative costs. Copayment provisions can be called for to save 
administrative costs such as costs of handling claims. For this reason, and assuming 
expected utility maximization on the part of consumers, it is optimal to exclude partially 
or entirely expenditures on health care items that occur frequently but in limited 
amounts such as minor medications (Mossin 1968). More specifically, if administrative 
costs are proportional to the expected volume of health expenditures, a feature of the 
optimal insurance contract is a fixed deductible (Arrow 1963). 
 
(b) Non-insurable loss. Illness typically involves not only financial costs but also 
non-financial losses such as pain and suffering. Optimal health insurance equalizes 
marginal utility of wealth in all states of nature but this is not equivalent to full coverage 
if there are complementarities between non-financial and financial losses. In particular, 
if marginal utility of wealth is lower in case of illness than in good health (due e.g. to 
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reduced ability to enjoy expensive types of consumption), optimal health insurance does 
not fully reimburse the financial loss (Cook and Graham 1977). 
  
(c) Ex-ante moral hazard. If the insurer cannot observe preventive effort on the 
part of the insured, a high degree of coverage reduces the incentive for prevention. 
Hence there is a trade-off between risk spreading through insurance and maintaining 
incentives to keep the risk of illness low. This trade-off leads to a premium function 
which is convex in the degree of coverage, such that full coverage should be particularly 
expensive (Ehrlich and Becker 1972). In SHI such a premium function is nowhere 
observed, although it could be easily administered because consumers cannot 
circumvent the progressive premium schedule by purchasing many insurance contracts 
with limited coverage and low premiums each.  
 
(d) Ex-post moral hazard. If the insurer could observe the health status of the 
insured, the optimal type of health insurance would provide indemnity payments, i.e. 
the insurance payment would not depend on the insured’s health care expenditure. With 
asymmetric information, however, linking reimbursement to expenditure is inevitable. 
Still, copayment provisions are needed to fend against overconsumption of medical 
care. The optimal copayment rate is higher the more price elastic the demand for the 
particular type of medical services (Spence and Zeckhauser 1971, see also Zweifel and 
Breyer 1997, ch. 6). Empirical evidence e.g. from the RAND Health Insurance Study 
(Manning et al. 1987) shows that there is a small albeit significant price elasticity of 
demand for most medical services (for a survey of the evidence, see Zweifel and 
Manning 2000).  
 
Conclusion 3: The optimal health insurance contract suggests several reasons for 
stopping short of full coverage. While administrative costs should be 
recovered by a deductible, the presence of non-insurable losses may and 
that of moral hazard definitely does commend a measure of proportional 
cost sharing, reflecting the price elasticity of demand for medical care in 
the last-mentioned instance. 
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5. The limits of social health insurance 
There appear to be at least four types of limits to social health insurance. First, the 
incentive structure of social insurers discussed in section 3 hampers product innovation. 
Second, the features of the optimal contract as described in section 4 imply that 
coverage provided by social health insurers needs to be limited in view of moral hazard 
effects. A third limit of a more institutional character emanates from the fact that health 
risks, while important, are only one type among several that need to be considered in 
The fourth and ultimate limit of course is nothing but the willingness of citizens to pay 
still higher contributions for higher-quality but more expensive health care, about which 
some evidence will be presented at the end of this section. 
 
5.1 Limits created by regulation  
Traditionally, social insurance is associated with contributions that are not graded to 
risk and even uniform across the population. This uniformity would be undermined if 
competitive social health insurers were to launch new products that fetch a higher 
premium. The only way to permit innovation is to let competitors with little potential to 
increase their market share run experiments, which if successful are imposed on the 
entire market. Of course, this is a far shot from the innovation process in actual markets, 
where most innovations fail, adoption occurs with considerable lags (Henke, 2005), and 
some competitors never adopt but already search for a still more promising alternative. 
In the case of a monopolistic scheme, innovation is only possible through a majority 
decision in parliament (or even a majority decision of the voters in a direct democracy). 
These impediments cause the current provision of health insurance to lag behind 
developments of preferences and restrictions prevalent in the population by years if not 
decades (Zweifel and Breyer, 1997, ch. 11.1).  
 
5.2 Limits imposed by the behavior of insurers 
The analysis of section 3 shows that the capability of innovation, i.e. of adapting the 
insurance product to changing demands, is limited in SHI as traditionally understood. 
When risk adjustment is imposed in order to ‘marry’ uniform premiums in the face of 
different expected cost with competition, insurers considering innovation fear the 
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financial sanction that goes along with attracting young clients. Finally, in the case of 
social health insurance not provided by a multitude of suppliers but a monopolistic 
scheme, the incentive for innovation is stifled even more. 
 
5.3 Limits imposed by institutional design   
Undoubtedly, health risks loom large in the lives of citizens. However, there are other 
risks confronting people over their life cycles. Adopting the categories of social 
insurance, one would want to distinguish the risks of accident, disability, old age, 
unemployment, increase in family size, and death of main breadwinner (Breyer, 2005; 
Zweifel, 2000b). While the relationships between these risks have not been fully 
researched yet, the available evidence points to positive correlations. This implies that 
the three assets to be managed over the life cycle, viz. health, wealth, and wisdom 
(Williams 1998) are likely to be positively correlated, an unfavorable situation for risk-
averse individuals. Therefore, insurance as a system should et least mitigate these 
positive correlations, e.g. by paying higher than expected benefits in one branch if there 
is a shortfall below expected benefits in some other. However, preliminary research at 
the macroeconomic level suggests that in several important countries, trend deviations 
of payments are positively rather than negatively correlated across categories. For 
example, trend deviations in payments of German social unemployment insurance are 
positively correlated not only with those of old age and pensioners insurance but also of 
social, health and accident insurance (see table 2). Not one out of a total of six 
correlation coefficients is significantly negative. 
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Table 2: Correlations of trend deviations in the benefits of German social 
insurance, 1975-1993 
 SOAS 
(1) 
SEB 
(2) 
SHI 
(3) 
SAI 
(4) 
SUI 
(5) 
SOAS (1) 
SEB  (2) 
SHI (3) 
SAI (4) 
SUI (5) 
1 
     -0.86* 
    0.45 
      0.91* 
      0.76* 
 
1 
   -0.33 
     -0.81* 
    -0.75* 
 
 
1 
       0.67* 
       0.65* 
 
 
 
1 
       0.83* 
 
 
 
 
1 
 * Correlation coefficient significantly different from zero 
    (5% significance level or better) 
 SOAS Old age and survivors insurance 
 SEB Employee benefits 
 SHI Social health insurance 
 SAI Social accidents insurance 
 SUI Unemployment insurance 
 Source: Sourcebooks for the Social Report of the Federal Government 
              (Materialbände zum Sozialbericht der Bundesregierung) 
 
Also, social health insurance fails to make up for shortfalls in the benefits of private 
insurance. While employee benefits for old age, which are counted as social insurance, 
are negatively correlated with private health insurance (as they should be for portfolio 
variance reduction), trend deviations of all the other branches of social insurance 
correlate positively with at least one of the lines of private insurance (see table 3). 
Conversely, again not a single out of 20 coefficients of correlation is significantly 
negative. 
Table 3: Correlations of trend deviations in the benefits of German private and 
social insurance, 1975-1993 
 
 SOAS 
(5) 
SEB 
(6) 
SHI 
(7) 
SAI 
(8) 
SUI 
(9) 
PLI (1) 
PHI (2) 
PAI (3) 
PGI (4) 
0.27 
0.79* 
-0.41 
0.43 
-0.08 
-0.72* 
0.28 
-0.25 
0.26 
0.56* 
-0.15 
0.16 
0.39 
0.92* 
-0.41 
0.54* 
0.25 
0.63* 
-0.26 
0.08 
Correlation coefficient significantly different from zero (5% significance level or 
better) 
PLI Private life insurance 
PHI Private health insurance 
PGI Private general liability insurance 
PAI Private accident insurance 
OAS Old age and survivors insurance 
SEB Employee benefits 
SHI Social health insurance 
SAI Social accident insurance 
SUI Unemployment insurance 
Source: Zweifel, (2000b),  Eisen, Schlesinger und Zweifel (1997) 
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Of course, this argument could be turned around to read that German private insurers do 
not meet their task of making up for the shortfalls in benefits occurring within social 
insurance. However, as shown in table 4, as many as 3 out of 10 correlation coefficients 
are significantly negative this time, pointing to at least some diversification effects 
achieved within private insurance. On the whole, then, social health insurance in 
Germany (but in Austria, Switzerland, and the United States as well, see Zweifel and 
Lehmann, 2001) might be largely responsible for present insurance systems keeping the 
volatility of individuals’ assets larger than necessary.  
 
Table 4: Correlations of trend deviations in the benefits of German private 
insurance, 1975-1993 
 
 PLI 
(1) 
PHI 
(2) 
PDI 
(3) 
PGI 
(4) 
PLI (1) 
PHI (2) 
PDI (3) 
PGI (4) 
1 
    0.37 
  -0.19 
     0.54* 
 
1 
    -0.41 
       0.76* 
 
 
1 
    -0.40 
 
 
 
1 
*  Correlation coefficient significantly different from zero  
     (5% significance level or better) 
 
This (admittedly preliminary) evidence suggests that the same amount of resource could 
produce more security for people, or conversely, that the same amount of security could 
be afforded for less money. This of course serves to limit the attractiveness of social 
health insurance for consumers. 
 
5.4 Limited willingness-to-pay of citizens  
The call for reform of current social security systems frequently is based on the 
argument that they cannot be financed any longer. However, anything that does not 
exceed GDP can be financed in principle. The argument therefore must be watered 
down to the statement that the willingness-to-pay (WTP) of consumers is limited, and 
mandated expenditure on any good or service in excess of that limit causes an efficiency 
loss. The problem with this argument has been that until recently, WTP for public goods 
in the health domain was not known. 
In the case of Switzerland, some evidence has become available. In a discrete choice 
experiment involving 1,000 individuals in 2003, WTP for additional services to be 
provided (or rather, compensation required for accepting cutbacks) by social health 
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insurance in exchange for an increased premium was measured (Telser et al., 2004; 
Zweifel et al., 2005).  
Table 5: Compensation asked for cutbacks in Swiss social insurance (2003) 
Amounts in CHF / month 
Socioeconomic  
characteristics 
Physicians  
selected on 
cost 
 criteria 
 
 
 
 
(1) 
Physicians 
selected 
on  
quality 
criteria 
 
 
 
(2) 
Physicians 
selected 
on cost & 
quality 
criteria 
 
 
 
(3) 
Access to 
new 
therapies 
and 
drugs 
delayed 
by  2 
years  
(4) 
Reimburse-
ment of 
generics 
only  
 
 
 
 
 (5) 
No 
reimburse-
ment of 
drugs for 
minor 
complaints 
 
 
(6) 
No small 
local 
hospitals 
 
 
 
 
 
(7) 
Total sample 103 (13.2) 53 (8.8) 42 (7.8) 65 (7.9) 3 (5.5) -6 (5.3) 37 (5.7)
By region 
German-
speaking 
88( 11.8) 38 (7.8) 26 (6.8)  56 (7.1) 5 (5.5) -5 (5.3) 31 (5.2)
French-
speaking 
191 (76.3) 138 (58.5) 136 (56.9) 117 
(45.4)
-14 (19.6)  -13 (19.2) 74 (31.0)
By average monthly income per household member 
< CHF 1500 67 (17.5) 44 (14.7) 35 (13.4) 52 (12.2) -5 (10.0) -2 (9.7) 28 (9.1)
CHF 1500 to 
4000 
108 (17.5) 56 (11.6) 42 (9.9) 66 (10.3) 9 (7.2) -5 (6.8)  42 (7.8)
CHF 4000+ 148 (55.8) 62 (29.9) 63 (29.7) 81 (29.4) -14 (17.5) 18 (17.8) 33 (16.8)
 
Note: 1 CHF equals 0.7 € at 2003 exchange rates. Standard errors in parentheses. 
 
Reading table 5 horizontally first, one notes that the amounts of compensation asked are 
consistently highest for consenting to a physician list based exclusively on cost criteria 
(col. 1). The sample average is as high as CHF 103 (€ 67 at 2003 exchange rates), or 
some 38 percent of the country’s average monthly premium of CHF 270 at the time. 
Still, the fact that it is finite speaks against the claim (often advanced by medical 
associations) that free choice of physician is virtually priceless. Selecting physicians on 
quality or quality and cost (i.e. efficiency) criteria already requires a lot less 
compensation, viz. 20 and 16 percent of premium, respectively (col. 3). These premium 
reductions can be granted by current Managed Care alternatives available in Swiss 
social health insurance. A possible delay of access to new therapies and drugs by two 
years would meet with much more resistance; it would have to be compensated by no 
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less than CHF 65 or 24 percent of premium on average. Limiting the drug benefit to 
generics only (col. 5) would have to be compensated by small amounts only that cannot 
be distinguished from zero. If the drug benefit were not to reimburse drugs used for the 
treatment of minor complaints, the Swiss on average would even be willing to pay a 
small amount [which again is not distinguishable from zero and likely reflects ‘warm 
glow’ (Andreoni, 1995)]. Finally, another cutback would be the concentration of 
dispersed existing hospital capacity in larger, centralized units (col. 7 of Table 5). In 
spite of the alleged superior efficiency of such units, this regulation would have to be 
compensated by CHF 37 or about 14 percent of the average monthly premium. 
 
An argument against SHI in this context is preference heterogeneity. If preferences 
differ, the uniformity imposed entails an efficiency loss. A first sign of preference 
heterogeneity is the fact that compensation asked differs importantly between income 
classes. Reading table 3 vertically, one notes that for example, individuals belonging to 
the top income class demand a compensation of 220 percent the amount demanded by 
those of the lowest income class for voluntarily accepting a physician list based on cost 
considerations only (col. 1). Of course, wealthy individuals can always opt out by 
paying extra; however, poor individuals do suffer a loss because the required reduction 
by CHF 67 or 25 percent in premiums could in fact be achieved by at least one health 
insurer if premium regulation permitted it to pass on its savings from Managed Care to 
consumers (Lehmann and Zweifel 2004).  
 
Preference heterogeneity is also reflected in amazingly large regional differences. In the 
case of accepting a physician list based on cost and quality criteria (col. 3), the French-
speaking minority of Switzerland is so distrustful as to ask for a compensation of no less 
than CHF 136 per month, more than five times as much as the German-speaking 
majority. Their WTP to avoid other restrictions is consistently more then twice as high 
as that of German-speaking Swiss.  
 
Conclusion 4: There are several limits to social health insurance, ranging from the 
behavior of social insurers on to moral hazard effects, institutional 
design preventing correlations between risks to be accounted for, and to 
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a willingness to pay for additional coverage that falls short of its 
additional cost.   
6. Summary and conclusions 
This contribution revolves about two related issues, viz., What are the reasons for the 
existence and growth of social health insurance?, and Are there limits to social health 
insurance? As to the reasons, demand for social health insurance may well reflect the 
demand for an efficiency-enhancing invention that overcomes certain market failures 
plaguing private insurance markets. In addition, equity considerations may also provide 
a powerful motive. On balance, however, the (scanty) available evidence points to a 
preponderance of public choice reasons. Social (health) insurance can be seen as an 
efficient instrument for gaining votes in the hands of politicians seeking (re)election 
(Conclusion 1 in the text). 
   
Turning to the supply of social health insurance, two settings need to be distinguished. 
One is provision by competitive health insurers who are regulated with regard to 
premiums and most products, the other, by a monopolistic public scheme. A simple 
model generates the prediction that completing regulation by risk adjustment (whereby 
insurers having an above-average share of low risks must pay into a fund that subsidizes 
those having an above-average share of high risks) undermines incentives for product 
innovation. The basic reason is simple. Innovation tends to attract the young, who are 
deemed to be low risks in all existing risk adjustment schemes; it therefore induces a 
financial sanction. The monopolist insurer also pursues product innovation to the extent 
that it lowers insurance payments (which is of interest to political authorities); however, 
its incentives are weaker than the competitive insurer’s given reasonable parameter 
constellations (Conclusion 2). 
 
For exploring the limits of social health insurance, the theory of the optimal health 
insurance contract serves as a point of departure. And indeed, this theory calls for a 
deductible to recover the administrative cost of providing health insurance. In addition, 
it may suggest partial coverage only in the case where the (marginal) utility of wealth is 
comparatively low in the state of sickness, causing material goods not to be very 
valuable. It specifically suggests a positive rate of coinsurance to combat moral hazard 
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effects. However, there are additional limits to social health insurance. An important 
one derives from its institutional nature. From the point of view of risk-averse citizens, 
an ‘umbrella policy’ covering not only the risk of illness but also those of accident, 
disability, early death of the breadwinner, (unplanned) additions to the family, and 
insufficient income in old age could be of considerable advantage to the extent that 
these risks cause their assets health, wealth, and wisdom (skill capital) to be positively 
correlated. However, consumers may well shy away from creating a public monopoly 
insurer with the task and authority to cover all these risks jointly. They might be more 
inclined to entrust this task to a competitive insurer that can be exchanged for another if 
failing to deliver. These considerations put another limit on social health insurance.  
 
Finally, political pressure to constrain social health insurance (and social security more 
generally) may reflect marginal willingness to pay on the part of citizens below 
marginal cost. Conversely, compensation asked for accepting restrictions in the domain 
of social health insurance (in the guise of reduced contributions) could be financed by 
health insurers through cost savings achieved.  Recent evidence from Switzerland 
relates to this second approach. It suggests that if health insurers were permitted to fully 
pass on savings accruing e.g. in their Managed Care options, they could compensate the 
average consumer sufficiently to make this options attractive. In all, there are clear signs 
of social health insurance encountering several limits (Conclusion 4). 
 
These limits will become more important in the future as the cost of health care 
increasingly occurs towards the end of human life, when they cannot be recouped by 
increased contributions any more. Moreover, social health insurance, by modifying the 
incentives of the great majority of health care providers of a country, induces the very 
change in medical technology that causes the cost of health care to increase so fast 
(Zweifel, 2003). The challenge will be to devise contracts that create incentives for the 
consumers to make do with the second-latest medical technology when they are death-
bound. However, competitive private rather than regulated social health insurers likely 
are better capable of meeting this type of challenge.  
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Appendices: Comparative statics 
 
A. Competitive social insurer 
 
The point of departure is equation (4) and (5) in the text, slightly rewritten, 
(A.1) { } { }( , ) ( ) ( ( , ) (1 ) / ( , )h l h l ie i P L P L e L i L L i sµ π π µπ µ π µ µ− − − − + − =  
(A.2) ( ){ }, ) ( ) ( , )h l se s P L P L i sµ π π µ− − − = . 
The effect of an increase in regulation (possibly from a state of no risk-adjustment 
scheme) is to decrease the difference in expected margins of high and low risks, 
(A.3) ( ) ( 0 :h l AP L P L .
R R
π π∂ ∂ − − − < = ∂ ∂  
For future reference, one also has 
(A.4) 2
/ 1 ( ,
( , )
i i i e
i i s
)iµ µ µ
µ µ
 ∂ − ⋅∂ ∂ −= = ∂   µ . 
Now, let the first-order conditions (A.1) and A.2) be subjected to a stock dR > 0. 
Written in matrix form, the comparative statics read, using (A.2) to (A.4), 
(A.5) 
[ ]
[ ]
( , ) 1 / 0
0 ( , ) 1
e i
e s
µ µ
/µ µ
 − − 
di
ds
    =
( , ) /
( , ) /
e i A R
e s A R
µ
µ
− ⋅∂ ∂  − ⋅∂ ∂  dR . 
Applying Cramer’s rule, one obtains 
(A.6) 
( )( )
( ) ( )( )( )
( , ) / 0
1
( , ) / ( , ) 1 /
e i A R
di
dR H e s A R e s
µ
µ µ µ
−−
− −−−
− ⋅∂ ∂
=  − ⋅∂ ∂ −  
0
 
     < , 
with H < 0 symbolizing the determinant of the Hessian matrix. Applying Cramer’s rule 
once more yields 
(A.7)  ( )( ) ( )
( )
( )( )
( , ) 1 / ( , ) /1
0 ( , )
e i e i A Rds
dR H e s A R
µ µ µ
µ
−− −
− −−
 − ⋅∂  =
/
∂
− ⋅∂ ∂
 
       < . 0
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Thus, both innovative and risk selection effort are predicted to decrease provided  
e(µ,i) < 1, which looks like a reasonable assumption. 
 
For comparison purposes, the predicted response to an increase in the amount of loss, 
dL > 0, is also derived. In this case, the comparative static equations read, 
(A.8) 
[ ]
[ ]
( , ) 1 / 0 ( , )( )
( , )( (1 ) ) .
0 ( , ) 1 / ( , )( )
h l
h l
h l
e s e i
di
e L i dL
ds
e i e s
µ µ µ π π
µπ µ π
µ µ µ π π
  − − −     = + + −         − − −   
 
This can be solved to obtain (with ( , ) 0e sµ = ) 
(A.9) [ ]
( )
( , )( ) ( , )( (1 ) ) 01
( , )( ) ( , ) 1 /
h l h l
h l
e i e L idi
e s e sdL H
µ π π µπ µ π
µ π π µ µ
−
− + + −= − − − −  
       
( ) ( ) ( )( ) ( )
(1/ ) ( , )( ) ( , ) ( , ) 1 /h lH e i e L i e sµ π π µ
− + −− −
  = − − + −     µ
  
       . 0>
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